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Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother:
But Court-Ordered Grandparent Visitation in
the Intact Family?
Laurence C. Nolan*
Children's Children are the crown of old men; and the
glory of children are their fathers.
Proverbs 17:6
I.

INTRODUCTION

American family law has consistently protected the intact
family from interference by the state, especially in childrearing
decisions. Beginning in the 1960s, states began enacting
statutes which abrogated the common law rule 1 that
grandparents had no legally enforceable right to visitation of
grandchildren. This rule, as articulated in Succession of Reiss 2 ,
was based on several principles. It was a parent's moral, not
legal, obligation to allow grandparent visitation. Court-ordered
grandparent visitation would undermine the parents' right to
rear their children as they think best. The state's intervention
in family disputes would make them more pronounced by
making them public. 3

* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.S.,
Howard University, 1961; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1974. I am
grateful to Charla Zeller, a third year law student, for her research assistance, to
Professor Warren Rosmarin, our law librarian, for his technical assistance, and to
Professor Mary B. Wyatt, Professor Madelyn Squire and George H. Nolan for their
helpful comments. I presented an earlier version of portions of this article at the
International Society of Family Law's North American Regional Conference on
Family Restructuring at the End of the Twentieth Century, held at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, in June, 1993.
1 Emanuel S. v. Joseph F., 377 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).
2 15 So. 151 (La. 1894). This case is regarded as the first case litigating
grandparent visitation, although it interprets the civil law and involves a lawsuit
by the maternal grandparent against the father for visitation with her
grandchildren, the children of her deceased daughter.
3 ld.
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Today, all states, except the District of Columbia, have
enacted grandparent visitation statutes, allowing grandparents
to petition the court for visitation under certain circumstances
against the wishes of parents. 4 Until recently, most statutes
excluded visitation rights within the intact family. There is
now a trend 5 to extend grandparent visitation statutes to the
traditional intact family. 6
Forced grandparent visitation may erode the stability of a
family that is intact. Little empirical data is avaliable to assess
the merits of grandparent visitation. 7 The Supreme Court of
the United States has declined to rule on the constitutionality
of court-ordered grandparent visitation in the intact family. 8
Therefore, it is imperative that state courts act to protect the
intact family. This article argues that state courts, when
deciding intact family grandparent visitation cases, must
adhere to a standard that is closely tailored to continue the
traditional policy of protecting the intact family from state
interference. Part II of the article examines the competing
interests of the intact family, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, and state. Part III contends that the standard
for state intervention in grandparent visitation cases must be
the traditional standard for state intervention in family life.
Part IV makes several arguments for following the traditional
standard. First, the reasons supporting the enactment of
grandparent visitation statutes in the 1960s and 1970s are not
relevant to grandparent visitation in the intact family. Second,

4 A few cases had allowed visitation without a statute. See Henry Foster &
Doris Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 643, 645-46 (1979).
5 See, e.g., Visitation Rights - Grandparents: Hearings on H.B. 30-93 Before
the Judiciary Committee, House of Delegates, State of Maryland Reg. Sess. 1-3
(1993) (statement of Sheila E. Hixson, 20th District Delegate); Jeanne Dewey,
House Gives Nod to Visitation Rights, MoNTGOMERY J., Feb. 17, 1993, at Al.
6 The intact family in this article is defmed as the traditional, nuclear
family composed of husband, wife and their biological children.
7 W. Glenn Clingempeel et a!., Children's Relationships with Maternal
Grandparents: A Longitudinal Study of Family Structure and Pubertal Status
Effects, 63 CHILD DEV. 1404, 1404-05 (1992).
8 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of any of the
grandparent visitation statutes. In 1992, the Court declined to hear a case which
interpreted the Kentucky statute and involved a traditional, biologically intact
family in King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992).
It also refused to hear a case which interpreted the Wisconsin statute and involved
a step-parent adoption intact family in In re C.G.F., 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wis.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
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the inherent problems of court-ordered visitation may be
disruptive to the intact family. Third, court-ordered
grandparent visitation, without compelling reasons, is an
unnecessary disruption to the intact family. Finally, the
traditional standard satisfies the constitutional standard for
state intervention in the intact family.
II.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

In court-ordered grandparent visitation the interests of the
intact family, parents, grandchildren, grandparents, and state
usually clash because of the principle of family autonomy. This
fundamental principle of family law serves to inhibit state
intervention in intrafamily domestic disputes. This principle
requires courts not to intervene to settle intrafamily domestic
disputes except in certain specific circumstances and to protect
the family from interference from others. 9

A.

The Intact Family and Parents

Historically, the principle of family autonomy has been
applied to the traditional intact family. The family, as a unit, is
autonomous and regulates its internal affairs. 10 The common
law also protected the intact family even though a parent's
rights might be sacrificed. For example, a child born to a married woman was presumed to be the child of her husband even
though he was not the biological fatherY Although the presumption was primarily to protect the child from the consequences of illegitimacy, it also protected the integrity and autonomy of the family unit. This presumption was so strong that
it was very difficult to overcome.
The principle of parental autonomy, usually used interchangeably with the broader concept of family autonomy, 12
protects the right of parents to rear their children without state
interference except in certain specific circumstances. 13 Paren-

9 See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14
MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916).
10 McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107
So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1959).
11 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
12 Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1984).
13 Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Succession of Reiss,
15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 643-53.
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tal autonomy is justified on several grounds. First, under natural law principles, parental rights are part of the natural order
of society, and parents are presumed to act in their child's best
interest. 14 Second, parental autonomy promotes the nation's
"commitment to diversity of views, lifestyles, and freedom of
religion . . . by allowing families to raise children in a wide
variety of living situations and with diverse childrearing patterns."15
Third, since there is no consensus as to what constitutes
the healthy adult and because of the impracticality of judicial
system supervision over childrearing, 16 a system promoting
parental autonomy will as likely produce a healthy adult as
any other one. 17 Thus, the principle of family autonomy protects both the intact family as a unit and the parent as an
individual in the exercise of childrearing rights. It also benefits
the state by supporting cultural intrafamily diversity.
The principle of family autonomy is also constitutionally
protected. The United States Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect the parent's right to rear children without interference from the state. 18 Beginning in 1965, Griswold v. Connecticut19 and its progeny have described family autonomy in
terms of the right of privacy.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to define
a family without state interference is also part of the right to
privacy interest. 20 This right extends to parents in the intact
family. Although some of the recent Supreme Court cases may
have weakened the biological parent's rights in childrearing,

14 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 887.
15 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected'' Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992 (1975).
16 Id.
17 Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 127-29 (1986).
18 The first cases were Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that among the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are the
rights "to marry, to establish a home and bring up children"), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating "[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations").
19 381 u.s. 479, 484-85 (1965).
20 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (allowing
grandparent to define family with children and grandchildren); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (allowing interracial couple to define family); Shandling,
supra note 17, at 127-29.
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those same cases have strengthened the constitutional protection of the integrity of the "family" as a unit. 21 In several cases in which unwed fathers asserted their parental rights, 22 the
Court protected the family unit in which the child was a member over the parental rights of the fathers. In the most recent
case, the Supreme Court protected an intact family from the
intrusion of an unwed father asserting parental rights when
the mother and her husband wanted to continue as an intact
family. 23 Thus, both the intact family as a unit and parents as
individuals have constitutionally protected privacy interests.

B.

Grandparents

Although grandparents are not asking to share legal custody of the grandchild, but merely to develop a relationship with
the child, court-ordered grandparent visitation may intrude
upon fundamental interests of the parents and the family.
Under the common law doctrine of family autonomy, parents
have the right to determine with whom the child develops a
relationship and the right to define the boundaries of the family.24 Grandparent visitation statutes have abrogated the common law and have created for grandparents an independent
right to petition the court for visitation. 25 A number of policies
may justify these statutes. There are unique bonds and relationships, some argue, between grandparents and grandchildren, which are mutually beneficial. 26 In view of the general
disintegration of the family, others argue, grandparent visitation strengthens family bonds and preserves intergenerational
contact. 27 Others contend that grandparents' rights are deriva-

21 Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J.
FAM. L. 393, 412-22 (1985-86).
22 See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
23 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
24 Shandling, supra note 17, at 126-27.
25 Some statutes include great-grandparents. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-337.01(B) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(a)(l) (Michie 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5 § 607(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.022(2a) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1993).
26 See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1992); Mimkon v. Ford, 332
A.2d 199 (N.J. 1985); Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 295-98 (1985); ARTHUR KORNHABER,
M.D. & KENNETH L. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN 55 (1981).
27 King, 828 S.W.2d at 631.
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tive of their children's rights. Thus, when their normal access
through their own children to their grandchildren is disrupted,
they should still have visitation rights to assert. 28 Finally,
some argue that this legislation's only justification is political:
the inevitable result of intense lobbying efforts in all fifty
states by grandparents and their supporters. 29
Grandparents may also assert that their right to visitation
is constitutionally protected under principles articulated in
Moore v. City of Cleveland. 30 The Supreme Court, in that plurality decision, found a zoning ordinance unconstitutional because it defined "family" as essentially meaning the traditional
intact family. The Court stated "[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition."31 The grandparent's
right to define the family to include access to the grandchild
conflicts with the parent's right to define the family to exclude
the grandparent.
Grandparents may also assert a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution if the state allows only certain grandparents to assert
visitation rights. 32 It is, however, unlikely that the
grandparent's right to visitation is itself a constitutionally
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The prevailing test for determining
whether an interest is constitutionally protected requires the in-

28 Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Iowa 1984); Kanvick v. Reilly, 760
P.2d 743, 745 (Mont. 1988); Emanuel S. v. Joseph F., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y.
1991). The disruption is typically the death or divorce of the grandparent's child.
29 Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dissension More Pronounced?, 55 AM. J. 0RTHOP5'YCHIATRY 277, 282-83 (1985); Ingulli,
supra note 26, at 297; Ross A. Thompson et a!., Grandparents' Visitation Rights:
Legalizing the Ties that Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1218 (1989).
30 431 u.s. 494, 505 (1977).
31 Id. at 504. The court may limit this case to apply to those situations
where the extended family member is actually living with the child. Rebecca
Brown, Comment, Grandparent Visitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J.
133, 142 (1991). See also Michael J. Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The
Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their ''Bundle of Joy," 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533,
547 (1991); Shandling, supra note 17, at 128.
32 Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987). Parents and
grandchildren could also raise similar equal protection arguments.
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terest to have been "deeply rooted in ... tradition". 33 Historically, grandparents did not have a right to visitation; therefore, it would fail this test of constitutionally protected rights.

C.

The Grandchildren

The law has not adequately delineated the right of children
to visit parents, let alone to visit grandparents. It is, therefore,
predictable that grandparent visitation statutes, following the
pattern of parental visitation statutes, are in terms of the right
of the grandparent, not of the right of the child. Arguably, the
grandchild's interest is to know and associate with grandparents.34 Under our jurisprudence, however, minors usually do
not act for themselves-others speak for them. Many states,
nevertheless, allow children to state a preference in custody
decisions. 35 The court typically considers the age and maturity
of the child in determining what weight the court will give the
child's preference in determining custody. 36 Some states follow
this approach in grandparent visitation statutes and allow the
grandchild to state a preference. 37 Conversely, the child's interest, for his or her own healthy development, is to live in a
stable, intact family environment without state interference. 38

D.

The State

The state's interest in court-ordered grandparent visitation
stems from both its parens patriae power and its police power.
Under the parens patriae principle, 39 the state has an obligation to intervene to protect children under certain circumstances: when their parents have not met their parental duties;
when the family is breaking up or has broken up; and when

33 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
34 Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 71 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947). Foster & Freed,
supra note 4, at 662, 675.
35 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(3) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.23(i) (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(1)(b) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Anderson 1989).
36 Posey v. Bunney 561 P.2d 400, 404 (Idaho 1977); Rose v. Rose, 340
S.E.2d 176, 178, 179 n.4 (W.Va. 1985).
37 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 752.01(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.330(1)(0 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d(Il)(g)
(1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(6) (1989).
38 See tnfra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
39 See Lawrence B. Cusler, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978); Shandling, supra note 17, at 129.
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there is a compelling public policy. The state then steps in and
substitutes its judgment for the parent's, but only where the
best interests and welfare of the child so demand. Presumably,
in grandparent visitation cases the state intervenes and orders
visitation in order to protect the child from the parent's decision to deny visitation.
The state's interest in court-ordered grandparent visitation
that stems from its police powers illustrates the conflicting
state interests. "The police power is the state's inherent plenary power both to prevent its citizens from harming one another
and to promote all aspects of the public welfare."40 The state
has established the family, traditionally the intact family, as a
unit recognized by the government and has delegated to parents the childrearing responsibilities. 41 Thus, stable marriages
and children being reared in intact families have historically
been considered fundamental to the general welfare of the
state. Grandparent visitation may be disruptive to both.
The state also has a constitutional interest in court-ordered
grandparent visitation since constitutionally protected fundamental rights are at stake if the state intervenes to order
grandparent visitation. The United States Supreme Court
views family autonomy as part of the fundamental right of
privacy. Within the boundaries of family autonomy are the
fundamental rights of childrearing and family definition. The
Court requires that before the state can regulate fundamental
rights, the state must have a compelling state interest and the
regulation must be closely tailored to effectuate only the legitimate state interest. 42
When the parties have competing interests, as there are in
grandparent visitation litigation, the court's usual approach is
to balance those interests. 43 When the intact family is involved, however, because of the importance of family autonomy,44 the court usually does not engage in balancing without

40 Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
1156, 1198 (1980).
41 "Our jurisprudence historically has reflected western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children." Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
42 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). See infra notes 107-116 and
accompanying text.
43 Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 1052, 1058 (Md. 1979).
44 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

REV.
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strong justification. Accordingly, if grandparent visitation statutes extend to the intact family, the court must first decide if it
should intervene to balance the interests. 45
Ill.

THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD FOR STATE INTERVENTION

The traditional standard for state intervention in family
life under its parens patriae power begins with a determination
that the child is harmed by the parent's decision, which in this
case is the parent's decision not to allow visitation. 46 This
standard of showing harm has consistently been used in abuse
and neglect cases 47 and in custody cases between parent and
nonparent. 48 In the latter, this standard is phrased in the
more familiar language of the "unfitness" of the parent. 49 Theoretically, the "unfitness" of the parent causes harm to the
child. 50 If no harm is shown, then there is no basis for state
intervention. 51 In determining harm to the child in custody
cases, the court must find that the parent's decision fails to
meet the minimum standard of care, not the best standard.
Mter the court determines that the child is harmed, the court
must then determine whether placing custody with the
nonparent will best address the harm and be beneficial to the
child. 52 Thus, before the state legitimately intervenes in family life, this two-step standard should be met.
This two-step standard should be applied to grandparent
visitation cases in the intact family because these cases are
45 Some argue grandparent visitation statutes go too far if they include the
intact family. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 958-62. The Illinois General Assembly
amended its grandparent visitation statute to include the intact family in 1989, but
repealed the amendment in 1991 at the urging of the Illinois Bar Association. The
Bar argued that the statute unduly burdened parents' childrearing rights. Brown,
supra note 31, at 133.
46 The threshold for state intervention in parental decisions is that the child
is harmed by the parent's decision. This standard should be used in all grandparent visitation cases, not only the intact family, because all abridge parental autonomy. See Bean, supra note 21, at 394-407, for a comprehensive discussion of the
threshold for state intervention in a parent's decision not to allow visitation. See
also Minerva, supra note :n, at 549; Wald, supra note 15, at 1004-07.
4 7 Minerva, supra note 31, at 549, 553-54.
48 Ex parte Mathews, 428 So. 2d 58 (Ala. 1983).
49 ld. at 59.
50 The parental preference doctrine and the presumption that custody should
be awarded to the parent instead of a third party are other statements of this
standard for awarding custody in parent-nonparent custody cases. See, e.g, Odell v.
Lutz, 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
51 Schuh v. Roberson, 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Ark. 1990).
52 Bean, supra note 21, at 424-25.
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akin to custody cases between parent and nonparent. 53 The
threshold for court intervention requires that (1) denial of visitation harms the child and (2) that the level of the harm warrants intervention. That the child would be better off with
grandparent visitation is neither a threshold harm, as Professor Kathleen Bean has perceptively written, 54 nor is it the relevant issue. The court must identify the particular harm that
deprivation of grandparent visitation causes a particular child.
Once the harm has been identified, the court intervenes in the
best interest of the child to determine whether court-ordered
grandparent visitation is necessary to remedy the harm and
would be beneficial to the child. 55 The court should not intervene in the intact family simply because grandparent visitation
is beneficial per se. 56 Without first finding harm, the state
would be substituting its judgment for that of the parent. 57
Only after the court determines that denial of grandparent
visitation will harm the child should the court then evaluate
whether the intrusion will remedy the harm.
This two-step analysis is the appropriate standard for
determining court-ordered grandparent visitation in the intact
family. Most courts, however, begin and end the analysis of
grandparent visitation with the assumption that grandparent
visitation is in the best interest of the child. 58 Courts omit altogether the crucial analysis as to whether the state should
intervene. 59 Courts may have unwittingly omitted this crucial
analysis because grandparent visitation statutes are often cast

53 Grandparent visitation cases involve litigation between a parent and a
nonparent. When the intact family is involved, the nonparent is always a parent of
one of the grandchild's parents.
54 See Bean, supra note 21, at 423-30. One dissenting judge stated that in
custody cases, showing general improvement in the child's life if custody were
awarded to a third party is not enough to deprive a parent of l!Ustody. A parent
was deprived of custody only if it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent was unfit. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 684 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J.,
dissenting).
55 Bean, supra note 21, at 394-95.
56 Id. at 483; King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
57 The state initially delegates childrearing responsibilities to parents. The
state does not take away these responsibilities unless the child is harmed. As
Professor Bean has stated: "For the state to delegate to the parents the authority
to raise the child as the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another
choice would be better, is to give the parents no authority at all." Bean, supra
note 21, at 441.
58 ld. at 430.
59 See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (1992).
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in terms of the best interest of the child. 60 The best interest
standard is not the appropriate standard because this standard
is generally used to settle disputes between parents, not disputes in which a third party is interfering with a parent's decisiOn.
On the other hand, the best interest standard is the appropriate standard between parents, because the competing interests of the parents "[t]end to cancel each other leaving only the
interests of the children as relevant considerations."61 The interests of grandparents and parents are not comparable and do
not tend to cancel each other out. If the best interest standard
were used without first showing harm, any interested person
could request custody of or visitation with the child because he
or she could demonstrate the child would be better off. The
state delegates childrearing responsibilities to parents and does
not take them away unless the child is harmed. 62
A few statutes require the existence of a substantial relationship between grandchild and grandparent before the grandparent has standing to petition the court for visitation. 63 But
these statutes still do not focus on the issue of whether to intervene. Although requiring a substantial relationship implies
that grandparent visitation is not accepted as being beneficial,
per se, a substantial relationship does not necessarily mean the
child is harmed if visitation is denied. In an attempt to limit
the judge's discretion under the best interest standard, a few
statutes explicitly define the factors that a court should consider when determining grandparent visitation. 64
Even if applicable, the best interest standard is frequently
misapplied by the courts. Although the burden should be on the
grandparents to prove visitation is in the child's best interests,
60 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1) (West/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102(2) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301(a) (1992).
61 In re Marriage of Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 63 (Or. 1987).
62 Bean, supra note 21, at 424.
63 See; e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1993); IOWA CODE § 598.35 (West Supp.
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992). The Minnesota statute requires
visitation be in the best interests of the child and not interfere with the parentchild relationship.
64 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(2) (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125A.330(1) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1013(b) (1989); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993). The best
interest standard is criticized because it is so broad that it gives too much discretion to the judge. Statutes which delineate the factors which the court must determine when applying the best interest standard are attempting to curb the judge's
discretion.
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courts have usually assumed that grandparent visitation is in
the best interest of the child. This assumption, in most cases,
has become, in effect, a legal presumption in the course of the
court's analysis. As a result the parent must prove visitation
would be harmful. 65 Courts have lost sight of the fact that it
is the parent who has a right to uninterrupted custody. 66
The traditional standard puts the burden where it rightfully belongs. The grandparent must show that denial of visitation
harms the child, granting visitation is necessary to remedy this
harm, and that visitation is beneficial to the child. Thus, if
court-ordered grandparent visitation is extended to include the
intact family, courts should determine these cases by applying
the traditional standard for state intrusion in family life.
IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD

Heretofore, state legislatures may have intuitively recognized the potential harm that grandparent visitation may cause
to the stability of an intact family and omitted the intact family
from grandparent visitation legislation. The state's interest in
the stability of intact families outweighs other considerations.
Nevertheless, if the trend to include all family structures in
grandparent visitation legislation continues, the following arguments support the contention that courts should interpret this
legislation by applying the traditional standard for state intrusion in family life. 67

A. Reasons Supporting the Early Grandparent Visitation
Statutes Are Not Relevant to the Intact Family
Grandparent visitation statutes evolved because of a disruption in the intact family by death, separation, divorce or a

65 In King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992), the court reasoned that "if a
grandparent is physically, mentally, and morally fit, then a grandchild will ordi·
narily benefit from contact with the grandparent." ld. at 632. The court found that
the child would be safe in the grandparent's home and upheld grandparent visitation in this intact family. One dissenting judge chided the court for finding that
the grandfather presenting such evidence had met his burden of proof under the
best interest standard. ld. at 635-36 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
66 Bean, supra note 21, at 398.
67 Some have argued parental rights should not be absolute but should be
guided by the traditional test for state intervention. See Bean, supra note 21, at
405. Subjecting all families to grandparent visitation would also meet the Equal
Protection argument because all families would be treated equally. See infra note
117 and accompanying text.
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custody proceeding. The first generation statutes provided
standing for grandparents to petition the court to visit with
their deceased child's children. 68 The second generation statutes, 69 following on the heels of the divorce rate explosion in
the 1970s, expanded to include standing for grandparents to
petition the court for visitation when their children did not
receive custody of the grandchildren in separation, divorce, and
custody cases. 70
The premise for these statutes was that the normal channel, through which grandparents have access to grandchildren,
is through their own children. When a child dies or becomes
the noncustodial parent in divorce, separation and custody
cases, the grandparent's access to the grandchild is often cut
off. These statutes create an access channel. Such statutes are
consistent with the principle that courts will not interfere with
an intact family unless it is broken. 71 Statutes allowing grandparent visitation in an intact family are radically out of step
with this fundamental principle. Families that have remained
intact, despite the national decline in traditional family structures, should be spared any intrusion that might weaken or
break them. 72

68 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
110 1/2, para. 11-7 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27a (West Supp. 197778); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9.2-7.1 (West 1971); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (Consol.
1966).
69 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, para. 607(b) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1973); see also Bush v.
Squellati, 522 N.E.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Ill. 1988) (discussing how the Illinois grandparent visitation statute evolved).
70 Many of the second generation statutes have been revised to give
standing to all grandparents in separation, divorce and custody cases.
71 The problem with these statutes is that courts still fail to make the analysis as to whether the family is so broken that the child is harmed by denial of
grandparent visitation, and granting visitation will alleviate this harm and be
beneficial to the child.
72 There is also the question of court-ordered visitation of the biological
grandparents in the intact adopted stepparent family (the child's stepparent adopts
the child) and the intact stranger adopted family (the adopting parents are not
stepparents to the child). Prior to their creation, the adopted child most likely
came from a broken home where the state traditionally intervened. Biological
grandparents may have already been awarded court-ordered visitation prior to the
adoption. It may be detrimental to the child to discontinue visitation after the
adoption. Under the theory that grandparent rights are derivative from their own
children, grandparents should cease to have rights when their children's rights
have been terminated. In adoption cases, parental rights are terminated. Many
states do not follow this theory of derivative rights in stepparent adoption cases
and allow court-ordered visitation for the biological grandparents. However, in most
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There is also support in behavioral science literature that
early grandparent visitation statutes reflect the traditional
standard. Studies show that a child, whose family has been
disrupted because of the death of a parent or of a divorce, is
often harmed if grandparent contact is not continued. 73 The
problem with these statutes is that they assume that harm
occurs in every case and need not be proved on a case-by-case
basis. The better, more consistent and more appropriate approach would be to apply the traditional standard in every
grandparent visitation case. This approach would preserve the
principles of family autonomy and would protect the child.
B.

Inherent Problems in Court-Ordered Visitation

The problems inherent in court-ordered visitation would be
disruptive to the intact family. 74 The initial problem the family faces in court-ordered visitation is determining the frequency
and length of the visits. Usually, "reasonable visitation" is the
statuatory language for determining the frequency and length
of visitation in custody decisions for the noncustodian. 75 Accordingly, courts in many of these cases have ordered an
amount of time that is equivalent to a noncustodial parent's
visitation. There is no analysis in these cases that indicates the
amount of visitation was ordered because it was the amount
needed to remedy the harm caused by the denial of visitation.
Courts have merely assumed that grandparents should have
this amount of time. 76 Moreover, the cases usually fail to analyze the effect the visitation will have on the intact family
unie 7 and fail to address the critical problems concerning the
states biological grandparents do not have court-ordered visitation rights in the
stranger adopted case.
73 lngulli, supra note 26, at 311.
74 These problems are continuing sources of conflict between parents in
many custody cases.
75 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:17-d(l) (1993); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-09-05.1 (1993).
76 Broadus v. Broadus, 217 So. 2d 811 (Ala. 1969) (first and third weekends
and other times); Kewish v. Brothers, 181 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1966) (two days every
other weekend); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) (a 17-month old child in
an intact family, visitation with her grandfather twice a week from 4 p.m. to 6
p.m. on each Wednesday and Saturday); Pacell v. Birkmire, 24 Phila. Co. 468
(Phila. Fam. Ct. 1992) (every other Sunday noon to 3:45 p.m.). But cf Leach v.
Leach, 306 P.2d 193 (Kan. 1957) (a weekend each 60 days); Schampp-Cook v.
Cook, 455 N.W.2d 216 (N.D. 1990) (one weekend per month).
77 Courts may discuss or minimize the level of hostility between the adults,
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parents' control over the actual visitation. Decisions as to what
can, should, and does occur during visitation, go to the essence
of parenting. It is the parents and not the courts who should
decide to whom and what to expose their children unless the
decision results in harming the child. 78
Further disruption may occur to the family because courts
usually enforce visitation orders through their powers of contempt. If the parents refuse to obey the order, the ultimate
penalty for such parents may be incarceration in the county jail
until they comply. On the other hand, parents may dispute
between themselves about obeying the visitation order. Such
parental disputes are disruptive to family life and are ultimately unhealthy for the child.
Typically, a visitation order cannot be modified without
court approval. 79 The intact family's normal activities, such as
moving from one place to another or disciplining the child, may
be subject to court approval if they interfere with grandparent
visitation. Modification usually means litigation even if it were
at the parents' instigation. Litigation is costly and is disruptive
to the family. Thus, the inherent problems of court-ordered
visitation may be so onerous that the benefit of grandparent
visitation, even when intended to remedy a harm that has been
identified by the court, may be canceled out by its overall disruptive impact on the intact family. It is likely that a child is
far better off to live in an intact family than to have the intact
family break up because of grandparent visitation issues.

C. No Compelling Reasons Unless Harm Is Shown
The state has used the principle of family autonomy to
protect the privacy and integrity of the family from disruption
by others unless there are compelling reasons. 80 Behavioral
science literature has been important in helping courts to decide custody decisions, to understand childhood development
generally and also to understand a particular child in a specific

but not the effect the hostility may have on the child. Cf King, 828 S.W.2d at 631
(Wintersheimier, J., dissenting). The Minnesota statute requires that visitation be
in the best interests of the child and not interfere with the parent-child relationship. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992).
78 See King, 828 S.W.2d at 635 (1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting); Bean, supra
note 21, at 446-47.
79 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 257 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 1979).
80 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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case. 81 This literature would be helpful in deciding grandparent visitation cases as well. 82 The principle underlying grandparent visitation is that the ties between grandparent and
grandchild should be maintained because there is a special
relationship between them that is beneficial to the child. 83
Nevertheless, there is insufficient behavioral science literature on the grandparent-grandchild relationship to reach a
conclusion that court-ordered grandparent visitation is in the
best interest of the child. 84 Researchers are just beginning to
study this relationship. The study by Dr. Arthur Kornhaber
and Kenneth Woodward in 1981 concluded that: (1) children
who have close relationships with a grandparent, unlike children who do not, are emotionally secure; and (2) there exists a
bond between grandparent and grandchild which is stronger
than any other except the parent-child bond. 85 This study has
been criticized, however, for its methodological weaknesses and
because other researchers have not been able to replicate the
results. 86 In addition, other empirical studies which have been
done do not support the conclusions of Kornhaber and
Woodward. 87 Another researcher has concluded that studies
reported in 1984, 1986 and 1987 show that the direct and indirect influences of grandparents on their grandchildren's development depended on a number of factors, including, geographical proximity, age and gender of grandparent and grandchild,
health status, socioeconomic conditions, and marital status of
the grandparent. 88 The most significant factor, however, was
the quality of the relationship between the grandparent and
the parent of the grandchild. 89 If this is true, then court-ordered grandparent visitation would be counterproductive and

81 See generally Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 107.
82 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 298.
83 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
84 See Ingulli, supra note 26, at 301-02; Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 281;
Thompson et al., supra note 29, at 1218.
85 KORNHABER & WOODWARD, supra note 26, at 55.
86 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 299-300. But advocates for passage of grandparent legislation have frequently cited this study to legislators. See, e.g., supra note 5
and infra note 99 for congressional committee action on grandparent legislation.
87 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 300 n.34. The more reliable studies will eventually be those using grandchildren and grandparents who are participating or have
participated in court-ordered visitation.
88 Thompson et al., supra note 29, at 1219.
89 !d.
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needlessly stressful to all three generations.
Psychological studies show that family stress and conflict
are emotionally damaging to children. 90 Grandparent visitation litigation in the intact family involves conflict between the
grandparent and the grandparent's own child. The grandchildren may experience stress and instability from the undermining of parental authority and the conflicting loyalties to parent
and grandparent. Studies also show that children's behavior in
divorce cases improved if there is a reduction in family conflict.91 Moreover, lawsuits, per se, generate stress and conflict.92 The emotional and psychological costs of litigation are
high. Findings of psychological studies about the parent-child
relationship justify these costs, however, when parents and
children are involved. There are no similar studies about the
grandparent-grandchild relationship to justify such costs. 93
Furthermore, litigation depletes family financial resources, as
well as its time and energy, often rendering the family incapable of defending itself from more financially secure grandparents. Because of these costs, parents may grudgingly settle the
case and agree to visitation when they would ordinarily not
agree.
On the other hand, psychological studies indicate that
children benefit from the continuity in grandparent relation
when there has been a disruption in the family because of
death, separation or divorce, or when the grandparent stood in
loco parentis to the grandchild. 94 These instances of continuing contact support the traditional standard for state intervention because the child is harmed if the contact is not continued
and the continuing contact addresses the harm. Similarly, if
the relationship between a grandchild and grandparent in an
90 Although most of these studies are based on the effect of divorce on children, studies also show that persistent conflict in the intact family is also damaging. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS 31-39
(1979); JOAN WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 215-21 (1980); Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282;
Diane Carlson Jones, Parental Divorce, Family Conflict and Friendship Networks, 9
J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 219 (1992); James Peterson & Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295 (1986) (finding persistent conflict in intact families is
also related to behavior problems).
91 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 281.
92 Jody George, Children and Grandparents: The Right to Visit, 8
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 4 (1987).
93 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 326.
94 GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 311.
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intact family is such that the child will be harmed upon separation and the continuing contact will address this harm, then
the contact should continue. Nevertheless, the strength of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship in the intact family is
unlikely to justify visitation. Such visitation would more likely
be an "onset of a new source or exacerbation of a chronic source
of conflict."95
Court-ordered grandparent visitation may impede the natural development of boundaries between parent and adult
child. The behavioral science literature suggests that adult
children must develop their own identities as parents and
spouses. Part of this development is accomplished by the
children's own parents relinquishing their parental status over
them. This relinquishment is the natural course of the relationship for both generations. 96 The end result should produce
better functioning parents for the grandchildren. Court-ordered
grandparent visitation interferes with this process.
Court-ordered grandparent visitation also changes how the
family functions. Family disputes are traditionally settled by
the family, not by the court. Parents, not grandparents, have
childrearing responsibilities. Court imposed grandparent visitation in the intact family interferes with these rights and duties.
The enactment of grandparent visitation statutes, for the
most part, is the result of intense political lobbying in all fifty
states by grandparents and their supporters for their rights at
the expense of the rights of others. 97 Their efforts have occurred
almost as a silent revolution, and have transformed grandparent visitation law. Legislators have been sympathetic to the
idea that grandchildren and grandparent have a unique bond
which should be developed. 98 Some commentators have ascribed the success of this lobbying to the political clout of this
generation of grandparents and to legislators who wish to appeal to an important voter group. 99 In light of the fact that

95 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282.
96 ld. at 284.
97 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 297; Richard S.
Victor, Grandparent and Stepparent Rights, 25 TRIAL 55 (1989).
98 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282.
99 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282. Both the House Select Committee on Aging and the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers have held hearings on
grandparent visitation rights and recommended that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws consider drafting a uniform law. See generally Grandparents: The Other Victims o( Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Services nf the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th
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these statutes emerged as a political movement and with little
attention to the ultimate effect on parents and their children,
courts must use the traditional two-part standard in deciding
grandparent visitation cases.
The importance of the intact family as an institution may
override including the intact family in court-ordered grandparent visitation if such visitation would have a disrupting and
destabilizing effect on the intact family. Although there is a
growing body of data about how well nontraditional families
can function in rearing children, 100 the studies do not contradict the importance of the intact family. The various studies on
aspects of child development are usually more favorable for
children in intact families than for children in non-intact
families. 101 Studies also show that children are better off
when they do not experience stress and insecurity associated
with divorce, separation and lawsuits. 102 Stress and instability generated from grandparent visitation disputes may further
weaken the stability of the institution of the intact family.
Moreover, the policy of all fifty states is to preserve marriage
and to promote family life. 103 Indeed, society has interests in
Cong., 2d Sess. (1983); Grandparent's Visitation Rights: Hearings on S. Con. Res.
40 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
100 See e.g.. Thomas J. Parish et a!., Evaluations of Self and Parents as a
Function of Intactness of Family and Family Happiness, 16 ADOLESCENCE 203
(1981); Helen Raschke & Vernon Raschke, Family Conflict and Children's Self-Con·
cepts: A Comparison of Intact and Single-Parent Families, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
367 (1979); John W. Santrock et a!., Children's and Parents' Observed Social Behavior in Stepparent Families, 53 CHILD DEVELOPMENTS 367 (1982).
101 See Darin R. Featherstone et a!., Differences in School Behavior and
Achievement Between Children from Intact. Reconstituted, and Single-Parent Families, 26 ADOLESCENCE 105 (1992) (indicating students from intact family ranked
highest); Robert D. Feiner et a!., Family Stress and Organization Following Parental Divorce or Death, 4 J. DIVORCE 67 (1980) (showing children with histories of
parental divorce/separation seemed to be experiencing significant lower levels of
educational stimulation from parents and having other problems than those from
intact families or homes broken by parental death); John Guidubaldi & Helen
Cleminshaw, Divorce, Family Health, and Child Adjustment, 34 FAM. REL. 35
(1985) (health ratings for intact-family children, their parents and siblings were
higher than ratings assigned to divorced-family children, their parents and siblings); Roger L. Hutchinson et a!., The Effects of Family Structure on Institutionalized Children's Self-Concepts, 24 ADOLESCENCE 303 (1989) (reviewing, in addition to
their study, other studies supporting the proposition that children in intact families
have slightly higher self-concepts); Vernon R. Wiehe, Self-Esteem, Attitude Toward
Parents, and Locus of Control in Children of Divorced and Non-Divorced Families,
8 J. Soc. SERV. RES. 17 (1984) (indicating children from divorced families showed
lower self-esteem, more negative attitudes toward their parents).
102 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 26-l8-105(l)(e) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

70

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

maintaining formal marriage as a societal norm and in protecting children to continue to live in an undisturbed intact family
environment. 104

D.

Constitutional Standard

The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether
the boundaries of court interference in family autonomy will be
extended to include court-ordered grandparent visitation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that family
autonomy is an area of family life in which the state cannot
intervene. Since 1965, the Supreme Court has viewed family
autonomy as part of the fundamental right of privacy. Within
the boundaries of family autonomy are the fundamental rights
of childrearing and family definition. The fundamental right of
childrearing has protected parents and the intact family from
interference by the state and third parties. No case has extended this right to a member of the extended family unless the
member is the child's guardian. 105 Thus, grandparents do not
have a protected constitutional right in childrearing.
Under Moore v. Cleveland, 106 however, the right of family
definition is a constitutionally protected right within the right
of privacy which both parents and grandparents may assert.
The grandparents' right of family definition, however, is not
equivalent to that of the parents' right of family definition
because of the parents' protected right of childrearing. Part of
the childrearing right is the parents' right to determine with
whom the child visits.
When the fundamental right of childrearing is at stake, the
state's regulation limiting that right must be justified by a

29 § 9001(b) (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-401 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 71-3-127 (1993).
104 In the words of Willima Galston:
A healthy liberal democracy ... requires the right kinds of citizens, possessing the virtues appropriate to a liberal democratic community. A
growing body of empirical evidence developed over the past generation
supports the proposition that the stable, intact family makes an irreplaceable contribution to the creation of such citizens, and thus to promoting
both individual and social well-being. For that reason, among others, the
community as a whole has a legitimate interest in promoting the formation and sustaining the stability of such families.
William Galston, A Liberal-Democrattc Case for the Two-Parent Family, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91, at 14.
105 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
106 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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compelling state interest, and the regulation must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at
stake. 107 The traditional state standard for intervention in
family life satisfies this standard. 108 The state should not intervene in the intact family to order grandparent visitation
unless the child is harmed by the parent's decision to deny
visitation and the intervention to order visitation will alleviate
the harm. Thus, the state's compelling interest to intervene in
the intact family is to protect the child from harm.
If protecting a child under the state's parens patriae power
is a compelling interest of the state, the best interest standard,
as applied by the states, is not the standard to use when the
state is interfering with the parents' fundamental right of
childrearing. The state's compelling interest is to protect the
child from harm, not to arbitrate when the child will be better
off. The best interest standard, as applied, omits altogether the
analysis that before a state can interfere with a parental decision, there must be a determination that this decision fails to
satisfy only the minimal standard of care, not the best standard.109 Moreover, the best interest standard diverts the
court from critically analyzing what harm court-ordered grandparent visitation may cause a particular family unit and ultimately its effect on the grandchild. In King v. King, 110 for example, the court assumed that there is a special tie between
grandparents and grandchildren and that the child was better
off with visitation. 111 The court's opinion did not consider the
potential harm to the child's family life with her parents, and
as a result jeopardized both the family and the child.
The state also has a compelling interest to protect the
general welfare of its citizens. The institution of the intact
family is basic to the state and may override even the state's
interest in protecting the child. 112 In Palmore v. Sidoti, 113

107 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
108 Bean, supra note 21, at 431-441; King, 828 S.W.2d at 431-441 (1992)
(Lambert, J., dissenting).
109 "The fundamental liberty ir,terest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
110 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992).
111 !d. at 631, 635.
112 State court decisions usually focus only on the state's interest in the child
under its parens patriae prerogative and not the state's interest under its police
powers.
113 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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the United States Supreme Court determined that the state's
interest in the child's best interest, with only a showing of
possible injury to the child, was not a compelling interest as
compared to the policy of eradicating racial discrimination.
Similarly, the state has a fundamental interest in maintaining
the intact family, since it is viewed as the fundamental unit of
the state and has traditionally been viewed as the best place to
rear the child. 114 The likelihood is greater that the child will
develop into a healthy adult when the family continues to exist
as an intact family. 115 Thus, if the family is intact, arguments
must be compelling before imposing court orders which may
destabilize it. 116
Grandparent visitation may also be constitutionally attacked based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If court-ordered grandparent visitation is not
allowed in the intact family, but allowed in non-intact families,
states may be unconstitutionally discriminating against some
grandparents, parents and families. All grandparent visitation
cases impinge upon the fundamental right of childrearing.
When a classification intrudes upon the fundamental right of
childrearing, state regulation limiting the right is unconstitutional if it is not justified by a compelling state interest and the
regulation is not narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake. The traditional standard for state
intervention in family life satisfies this standard. 117 Thus, if
all grandparent visitation statutes included all families, the
Equal Protection Clause issue would not be raised because all
grandparent visitation would be treated similarly and submitted to the same standard.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is probably no more painful situation than for adult
children to be at odds with their parents over grandparent
visitation. The court, however, is not the best forum to resolve
this painful situation. The reasons articulated in Succession of

114
115
116
harm to

Bartlett, supra note 12, at 882; Galston, supra note 104.
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
Based on constitutional standards, the state may require a higher level of
the child in intact families than would be required in non-intact families

because of the importance of the intact family.
117 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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Reiss 118 remain as valid today as they were in 1894. Courtordered grandparent visitation intrudes upon the traditional
principle of family autonomy. It interferes with basic rights of
parents to rear their children without state intervention unless
the child is harmed by the parents' decision and such intervention will address that harm. Court-ordered grandparent visitation in an intact family may cause unnecessary stress and disruption, and may ultimately cause its demise. Thus, if a court
must decide an intact family grandparent visitation case, the
court must apply the traditional standard for state intervention.

118 15 So. 151 (La. 1894).

